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Abstract 
This 3-year research and development effort focused on what we believe is a significant 
technical gap in existing modeling and simulation capabilities: the representation of 
plausible human cognition and behaviors within a dynamic, simulated environment. 
Specifically, the intent of the Simulating Human Behavior for National Security Human 
Interactions project was to demonstrate initial simulated human modeling capability that 
realistically represents intra- and inter-group interaction behaviors between simulated 
humans and human-controlled avatars as they respond to their environment. Significant 
process was made towards simulating human behaviors through the development of a 
framework that produces realistic characteristics and movement. The simulated humans 
were created from models designed to be psychologically plausible by being based on 
robust psychological research and theory. Progress was also made towards enhancing 
Sandia National Laboratories’ existing cognitive models to support culturally plausible 
behaviors that are important in representing group interactions. These models were 
implemented in the modular, interoperable, and commercially supported Umbra® 
simulation framework. 
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1 Introduction 
The primary intent of the Simulating Human Behavior for National Security Human 
Interactions (HI) Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project was 
to develop a human interaction framework that simulates intra- and inter-group 
interaction behaviors, as well as to demonstrate initial human modeling and simulation 
capability derived from a psychologically plausible cognitive framework. To achieve this 
objective, the existing Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) modeling architecture was 
extended to allow cognitively modeled simulated humans, or “cognitive characters” to 
interact with each other, their environment, and with actual humans in a behaviorally 
realistic and psychologically plausible manner. Towards this end, substantial progress 
was made in simulating human cognition and behaviors in a manner that produces life-
like characteristics and movement. 
Ultimately, the goal of this effort is to help create the groundwork for human simulation 
models that can be fielded as next-generation Modeling and Simulation (M&S) training, 
behavioral forecasting, and tactics development tools. With this purpose in mind, the HI 
work integrated, and thus leveraged, multi-million dollar past investments that include 
Umbra and the SNL cognitive modeling architecture. The result of this effort is a M&S 
capability that will serve as a technical foundation for subsequent national security 
analysis and security personnel training. Overall, the HI cognitive modeling framework 
was designed to be an interoperative architecture that can serve several different 
application areas besides human simulations, such as augmented cognition, robotics, 
medicine, and educational needs (see Figure 1 below).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Potential application areas for the SNL cognitive model architecture 
 
  10
1.1 Traditional Modeling Limitations  
Using human simulations for training is potentially an effective way to achieve 
significant reductions in cost and manpower. Current human simulations are appropriate 
for many domains that are strictly defined. However, when the domain environment is 
highly dynamic and complex and needs to be realistic, current simulation methods tend to 
fail. This occurs because training environments involving human simulations presently 
do not have the resolution and fidelity required to be able to replicate the asymmetries 
that are often seen in the “real world.” Existing simulations also focus almost exclusively 
on modeling reactive, physical behaviors instead of the underlying cognitive process that 
actually drive these behaviors. Consequently, simulated human behaviors in current 
simulations tend to be brittle, especially in changing environments and scenarios. 
Moreover, players can easily “game the system” after learning its limitations. A potential 
benefit of using a cognitive model architecture that is both psychologically realistic and 
flexible is that it could ultimately address the resolution and fidelity problems that face 
current human simulations. For instance, the existing HI framework can exhibit cognitive 
characteristics of foreign adversaries, including their basic perceptions, mindset (i.e., 
context, goals), and the significant physical characteristics and behaviors that are 
reflective of individuals within a particular country or geographical region.  
Advanced cognitive models could eventually provide US governmental agencies with 
additional tools for dealing with evolving threats through action/counter-action behavior 
forecasting and simulations. Indeed, using cognitive models for behavior forecasting is a 
significant long-term goal of this effort. The ability to generate a scalable number of 
cognitive characters that interact and behave in a culturally and sociologically accurate 
manner will allow US agencies to play “what if” simulations so as to test different policy 
and/or military approaches to specific situations. Moreover, they could serve to forecast 
the movements and general behaviors of large groups of individuals in response to US 
policy, military actions, and/or critical events that impact the general population (such as 
terrorist bombings and natural disasters, etc). In fact, the HI framework is currently being 
applied to the modeling of behaviors and cumulative economic effects on the US 
population in the aftermath of a simulated natural disaster event (Cognitive Modeling of 
Human Behaviors within Socio-Economic Systems project, LDRD 06-1102, will be 
further discussed in the potential applications section). 
Overall, it is anticipated that the capabilities developed by this LDRD will ultimately 
provide security enhancements and/or new technologies that will aid in formulating better 
domestic and foreign security strategies. Moreover, it is expected this project will serve 
as a technical foundation for next generation training tools for DOE response forces and 
DoD military personnel. 
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2 HI Cognitive Modeling Framework 
The HI framework is designed to be a psychologically plausible framework of human 
thought and behavior (see Figure 2). Thus, an important feature of the framework is its 
primary emphasis on psychological and sociological realism. This includes the need for 
realism in cognitive functioning of individuals, realism in the sociological behavior of 
individuals within groups, and realism in the physical responses of individuals to stimuli. 
In this way the framework is capable of representing different types of individuals (e.g., 
red/blue forces, instigators, general public, etc.) who may, by and large, be similar to one 
another but exhibit differences in thoughts and behaviors. 
 
 
Figure 2. A high level view of the SNL cognitive modeling architecture 
 
 
2.1 Overview 
The HI cognitive framework consists of a human-representative computational model 
through which a cognitive character recognizes patterns of stimuli in the environment 
and responds to those stimuli according to current contexts, goals, and emotions. The 
cognitive characters can sense each other, react to each other, and move about in a 
simulated 3D environment. Moreover, the cognitive characters have selected spatial 
capabilities that can interface to future perceptual and motor functions. For example, they 
can maneuver through a building, perceive and recognize objects (such as other 
characters) within the buildings, and recall the layout of rooms they entered. In addition, 
the cognitive characters’ emotion states and the actions of other cognitive characters will 
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affect their behaviors. For instance, fearful cognitive character adversaries may find a 
place to hide or seek to escape a building, whereas cognitive characters in an agitated 
state may act in an aggressive manner. Collectively, these functions permit a potentially 
more accurate simulation in which actual humans could interact with them in a manner 
that more realistically reflects human thoughts and behaviors. 
The HI framework is a cognitive structure that is an expansion of the general SNL 
cognitive architecture. The HI framework sits on top of the Sandia Cognitive Runtime 
Engine with Active Memory (SCREAM). In this application, SCREAM acts as a general 
purpose engine that allows the HI-specific framework to operate. The HI framework is 
implemented in Umbra®, a C++-based, modular simulation framework that is High Level 
Architecture (HLA) capable (See Gottlieb et al. 2001; Gottlieb et al. 2002; Van Leeuwen 
et al. 2004). Umbra was designed for modeling complex physical systems and has been 
used successfully to model systems containing robots, sensors, and non-cognitive, 
simulated humans. 
The HI framework consists of three primary modules that handle semantic knowledge, 
pattern recognition, and action generation. The semantic module incorporates an 
associative network with nodes representing each critical concept or “schema” embodied 
in each cognitive character. Pattern recognition and comparator modules provide 
mechanisms for: (1) evaluating the evidence provided by cues favoring or conflicting 
with each situation, (2) assessing the validity of the current situation, (3) determination of 
a valid situation when the current situation is judged not to be valid, and (4) 
implementation of top-down activation.  
The HI framework is distinctive in its instantiation of human decision-making, as 
opposed to more common production rule-based approaches (see Forsythe, Bernard, 
Xavier, Abbott, Speed, & Brannon, 2002; Forsythe & Raybourn, 2001; Forsythe & 
Xavier, 2002). That is, instead of using production rules that drive behaviors of cognitive 
characters, it uses levels of activation for perceptions and states. Behaviors derived from 
production architectures are guided by strict “if-then” rules, which state that if an 
objective is to do something and the parameters have been satisfied, then it will perform 
an operation associated with that objective. Production rules are efficient and appropriate 
for architectures that are chiefly concerned with behavioral control and predictability. 
The HI framework seeks predictability as well, but it puts a much greater emphasis on 
modeling the cognitive processes that ultimately guide the behaviors of cognitive 
characters. It is asserted that rigorous modeling of cognitive processes will ultimately 
result in more accurate, predictive behaviors. For example, the HI framework allows for 
multiple perceptions, goal states, and action intentions which can concurrently have some 
degree of activation. Once a perception has been activated by cues in the environment, it 
may trigger a specific, intermediate goal state if that state is consistent with higher-level 
goals and current environmental conditions. The intermediate goal that is activated will 
trigger an action intention state. The action intentions that are ultimately chosen will be 
mediated by current emotion states (i.e., fear, anger) that are affected by what they 
perceive in their environment. 
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While comparatively new, it is asserted that the underlying framework emphasizing 
pattern recognition, integration of perceptual, cognitive and affective processes, including 
multi-modal memory representations, and other features provides the basis for a 
substantially more realistic and flexible representation of human cognition. Yet, it is 
recognized that integration with an abstract decision-based system could provide 
additional capability for applications that require complex logic, such as inductive, 
deductive, and abductive reasoning. Implicit to recognition of a situation, there is 
recognition of goals, or attainable states, and the actions needed to realize those goals, 
including likely intermediate states. The cognitive subsystem serves in our model as the 
point where the diverse emotions, stressors, memories, and other factors are all integrated 
into a decision for action (or inaction) in order for a transition to the next state (or return 
to the current state).  
This human ability to recognize a situation quickly and accurately and respond 
accordingly, as opposed to a lengthy internal discourse in pros and cons, is one of the 
differentiating features of SNL’s theoretical basis for the cognitive model framework—
that is, humans may collectively and instantly react to a situation (such as a cheer when a 
baseball player hits a homerun) without deliberating with each other. Just as recognition 
of situations leads to the development of a context and associated expectations, this 
method of interpreting the world also lends itself to immediate recognition of events or 
objects that do not fit in the current context. Similarly, events that do not fit in the current 
context are also immediately noticeable. 
Also within the SNL modeling framework, it is recognized that cognitive processes are 
inseparably interwoven with state and trait emotional processes. The model of human 
emotion encompasses multiple aspects of emotion. At present, a model with emotions 
would include surprise-fear and frustration-anger. The choice of emotions was based on a 
large body of cross-cultural and neuropsychological research (e.g., LeDoux, 1998). 
When constructing a model, each concept may be attributed to one or more emotional 
component that is associated with specific levels of activation. For example, a disliked 
individual may be represented as a concept for which there is an association with a high 
level frustration-anger. Activation of a specific concept or situation contributes to the 
weighted averages that determine the overall activations of associated emotional 
components. The specific emotion activation levels are converted to fuzzy set (e.g., high-
fear) representations that are then feed into context recognition patterns. In the near 
future, emotions will have a reciprocal effect on cognition, causing an increase in concept 
or situation activation that triggers the emotion and active inhibition of other concepts 
and situations. In the future, as with the current interactions, emotion and cognition will 
be consistent with neuropsychological findings and, thus, will allow certain 
neuropsychological phenomenon to be demonstrated by the framework.  
By and large, the HI framework can be viewed as three interconnected, high-level 
components that basically correspond to “pre-cognitive” (attention), “cognitive” 
(perceptions, states, goals), and action generation states (motion control). A discussion of 
each interconnected component and how they relate to actual human psychological 
processes is presented below. 
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2.2 Semantic Memory System 
Within the HI framework, knowledge and the relatedness of concepts is represented 
within a semantic memory system. Relatedness refers to the awareness that two concepts 
are associated with each other by virtue of being members of the same category and 
operating together. When concepts are extracted via automated knowledge capture 
techniques, the relationship between concepts is based on a representation of each 
concept as a vector in a high-dimensional space. The cosine similarity of vectors for a 
given pair of concepts provides the basis for the strength of the relationship between 
concepts. The relatedness of concepts derived in this manner then provides a basis for 
simulating the priming that occurs for a concept in response to the prior presentation of a 
related concept (Forsythe & Xavier, 2005). 
Certain concepts are likely to occur in conjunction with a perceptual context, which 
forms the basis of an expectation. For example, noticing “potentially hostile people” may 
prime the expectation of seeing “armed soldier.” If the existing pattern of concepts is on 
the verge of providing enough evidence for this context to be activated, then only a minor 
amount of evidence that hostile people are in the area is needed to prime the expectation. 
It also might be that very strong evidence from only a small number of concepts is 
enough to activate a context. Once a context is activated, the associated concepts are 
primed so that corresponding sensory inputs produce accelerated and supplemented 
activations. The semantic memory component thus incorporates an associative network 
with nodes representing each critical concept known to the particular cognitive character. 
A pattern recognition component (embedded in SCREAM’s ContextRecognizer module) 
and comparator component (in implementation) also provide mechanisms for evaluating 
the evidence provided using cues favoring or conflicting with each situation, as well as 
assessing the validity of the current situation, determination of a valid situation when the 
current situation is judged not valid, evaluation of unexpected cues, and implementation 
of top-down activation (Bernard, Xavier Wolfenbarger, Hart, Waymire, Glickman, & 
Gardner, 2005). 
A certain context may also prime humans to continuously attend to specific stimuli in the 
environment, so long as that context is activated. For example, the context of “being in a 
dangerous area” may prime a person to hear footsteps behind him or her and see shadows 
that have the shape of a human. In the HI framework, certain contexts may heighten the 
activation of specific cues in the environment. This generally occurs when there are 
contexts with salient cues that indicate danger to the cognitive character.  
Concepts can support (positive cues) or oppose (negative cues) the activation of a 
context. For example, the perception “I am at work” is supported by the positive cue, “in 
my office” and is opposed by the negative cue, “watching sports on television.” The 
levels of activation are mediated by associated weights. The weights link concepts to 
contexts and concepts to states in an analogous manner (as distinguished from a purely 
logical one) for the pattern recognition portion of the model. The weights also indicate 
their level of significance related to a particular context or state. 
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2.3 Interaction of Semantic Memory and Pattern (Context) 
Recognition in SCREAM 
2.3.1 Basic Cognitive Elements 
A concept is the most fundamental element of the SNL cognitive architecture.  
Abstractly, a  concept is a representation of known regularity arising from external and/or 
internal data sources, as well as representations that are based entirely upon associations 
between other representations and have no specific physical manifestation (e.g., the 
attributes short, busy, free) and/or elements of other memory systems. 
In SCREAM, concepts are elements of semantic memory. For practical purposes, 
concepts are given names, although the cognitive architecture associates no meaning 
directly with a name itself (Integration of natural language capabilities with the 
architecture might create an indirect association). Mapped to English words, some 
examples of concepts are bicycle, clown, elephant, popcorn, seal, water, big, gray, wet, 
free, eats, walks, rides, chases, and conceals-from. Note that for brevity, we will write, 
e.g., “…the concept walks...” instead of “…the concept named ‘walks’…”.  
Theory linking the psychological to the physiological states that semantic memory 
processes—such as rise, decay, and spreading activation (or, at least, priming)—involve 
the activation of localized neural assemblies oscillating in the 10-13Hz bandwidth (“high 
alpha”). In the simplest view, each concept is represented by a neural assembly and the 
neural assembly associated with a concept that is “currently used” in cognition will rise 
above baseline in terms of both frequency and amplitude. 
Contexts can be defined as meaningful perceptual representations that are based on 
recognizable patterns of stimuli, as well as, consistent with situation models, schema and 
theme-based representations of events. The basic idea is that context activation behavior 
is governed by pattern recognition applied to the activation trajectories of concepts. A 
concept that plays a role in the recognition of a context is known as a cue. For example, 
the concepts bicycle, clown, elephant and popcorn in a cognitive model might be cues 
whose activations tend to cause activation of the context circus. Activation of a context, 
in turn, can cause top-down activation of priming of its cues. 
A context activation (recognition) mechanism has been proposed that builds on weighted 
summation of concept activations followed by a leaky integrator. According to theory 
linking the psychological to the physiological, the context recognition process is 
associated with oscillations in the 4-7Hz bandwidth (i.e., “theta”; see Klimesh, 1996). 
Instances provide a means to associate entities in the world (real, perceived or cognitive 
character) with specific concepts. If we view a concept as a relation, then a complete 
instance of that concept associates each field (slot) of the relation with an entity.  
Instances enable cognitive models running in SCREAM to properly keep track of 
contexts that overlap in terms of concepts even when the entities involved do not overlap. 
Abstractly, a concept instance maps the slots of a concept to entities. For a practical 
definition and representation, SCREAM uses entity identifiers (entity IDs) in its 
computational framework. An entity identifier is simply an integer that is associated with 
an entity at some time. This association may be done by or in collaboration with other 
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components of the system that is part of cognitive model. For example, a perceptual 
component might associate a new entity identifier with each entity it recognizes as 
distinct from entities it has encountered before. 
In a (running) SCREAM model, a concept instance is uniquely identified by a concept 
and a vector of entity IDs such that the dimension of the vector matches the arity of the 
concept. For example, clown {31} and clown {22} uniquely identify instances of the 
concept clown, and chases {22, 31} uniquely identifies an instance of the concept chase.   
Note that we will usually write, e.g., “…the concept instance clown {22}…” instead of 
“…the concept instance identified by ‘clown {22}’…” for brevity.   
We similarly build the definition of context instance from context so that a context 
instance is uniquely identified by a context and a vector of entity IDs—for example 
PieFight {31, 22}.  
If a concept (context) can apply only to the entire universe of a cognitive model instead 
of to entities in that universe, then it is appropriate for that concept (context) to have at 
most, one instance. If there is no entity (physical or abstract) that needs to be associated 
with the concept, then it is appropriate for the vector of entity IDs for its instance to have 
dimension zero. ValentinesDay {}, for example, is the only possible instance of the 
concept ValentinesDay. However, if there is an entity to be associated with that concept, 
then its instance should be associated with an entity ID. For example, WhiteHouse {1600} 
or IndependenceDay{17760704}. 
A Non-Specific Entity ID is defined to enable incompletely specified concept instances 
and context instances. A concept instance whose vector of entity IDs does not have the 
the Non-Specific Entity ID as an element is said to be completely specified. 
2.3.2 Context Patterns and Context Instance Instantiation 
The Context recognizer currently supports the construction and recognition of two types 
of patterns, cue vector context patterns and XQ context  patterns. 
2.3.2.1 Cue Vector Context Patterns 
Cue-vector context patterns are templates for context instances composed from no more 
than a fixed number of concept instances, usually instances of different concepts. 
A context vector cue pattern is a vector { }iQ=Q  of triples ( , , )i i i iQ P w= m , where: iP  is 
a concept (name); iw  is a weight; and for each j  the
thj  element of integer vector im  
maps the thj  slot of the concept (named) iP  to a slot of the context.  We will usually use 
the notation ( ) ( ) ( ),   ,  ,X X Xi iQ PQ etc. when describing the cue pattern for a context X . 
Note that the dimension of im  is equal to the arity of iP . 
Example 
Suppose a cognitive model has the unary (i.e., arity one) concepts dominant and 
submissive and a binary concept attacks.  Then we can define a binary context 
Dominated-by that has the pattern 
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Dominated-by  3  submissive 0.4 0  attacks 0.6 1 0  dominant 0.5 1 
whose vector of cues (Dominated-by)Q  =  
{ (submissive,  0.4, {0}), (attacks, 0.6, {1, 0}), (dominant, 0.5, {1}) } . 
In our notation, index numbering for elements of a vector begins with 0. The {0} in 
(submissive, 0.4, {0}) maps slot 0 of submissive  to slot 0 of  Dominated-by. The  {1, 0} 
in (attacks, 0.6, {1, 0}) maps slot 0 of attacks to slot 1 of Dominated-by and slot 1 of 
attacks to slot 0 of Dominated-by. Finally, the {1} in (dominant, 0.5, {1}) maps slot 0 of 
dominant  to slot 1 of Dominated-by.  
2.3.2.2 Context Instances 
Formally, an instance ( )( , , , , )XXχ σ= g Q p  of a context X  has a tuple g  of entity IDs 
and a non-empty tuple  { }kp=p  of active concept instances that it associates with 
elements of the pattern vector ( ) ( ){ }X XiQ=Q  via the one-to-one map σ  from one set of 
indices to another. g  serves as χ ’s bindings and has the same arity as X . The concept 
instances associated with a context instance must simultaneously unify with its pattern 
under the mapping σ . Note that the Non-Specific Entity ID unifies with any entity ID. 
Example 
Suppose that attacks(56,13) and dominant(56)  are active concept instances.   We verify 
that (Dominated-by, {13,56}, (Dominated-by)Q , {attacks(56,13), dominant(56)}, {1,2}) ,   with 
(Dominated-by)Q = { (submissive,  0.4, {0}), (attacks, 0.6, {1, 0}), (dominant, 0.5, {1}) }, as 
above, represents a legal instance of Dominated-by. 
• {attacks(56,13), dominant(56)} is non-empty. 
• (Dominated-by) (Dominated-by)(0) 1P Pσ = =attacks, and
(Dominated-by) (Dominated-by)
(1) 2P Pσ = =dominant. 
• The tuple {13,56} has two elements. 
• (Dominated-by) (Dominated-by)(0) 1σ =m m ={1,0}; 
(Dominated-by) (Dominated-by)
(1) 2σ =m m ={1}.  
(Dominated-by)
(0) 0[ [0]] [1] 56 [0]σ = = =g m g b ; 
(Dominated-by)
(0) 0[ [1]] [0] 13 [1]σ = = =g m g b . 
(Dominated-by)
(1) 1[ [0]] [1] 56 [0]σ = = =g m g b , which is consistent. 
Note that there is no need for there to be an instance of the concept submissive. 
The set of context instances is updated as the Context Recognizer learns of changes to the 
set of active concept instances. The activation level of a context instance is updated at a 
rate in the 4-7Hz range according to the cognitive framework simulator clock. An 
instance χ  of context X is a member of the set of context instances maintained by the 
Context Recognizer if and only if there is no way to add an active concept instance to χ ’s 
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concept instances { }kp  and extend its map σ  and have the result be a legal context 
instance. In other words, the set of maintained context instances is the maximal set of 
context instances such that each member is maximally unified with respect to the set of 
active concept instances. Intuitively, this means that the Context Recognizer maintains all 
the context instances that each takes into account all the cues it can without being 
inconsistent. Since this thoroughness might not be cognitively plausible in light of 
capacity limitations, the SCREAM Context Recognizer enables limiting output context 
instances to a specified number of context instances ranked according to activation level. 
Inhibitory bias can be specified to be applied in the computation of the activation of 
instances of a context. Basically, the bias is subtracted from what would otherwise be the 
immediate activation in computing the activation level of a context instance. Thus, if 
( )Xβ  is the (inhibitive) bias of context X and ( )( , , ,{ }, )X kX pχ σ= g Q  is an instance of 
X , the expression for immediate activation of χ  is 
( )
immed ( )( ) max * ( ) ,0 ,
X
k k
k
a w a pσχ β⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∑  
where ( )ka p  is the (gross) activation level of concept instance kp  at the time. 
Computation of the gross activation level of χ  is based on applying an activation 
function to immed ( )a χ  and then applying a normalized leaky integrator to the result. Note 
that a normalized leaky integrator is a leaky integrator followed by a scaling factor such 
that for any given constant input the steady-state output will approach that input. 
2.3.2.3 XQ Context Patterns 
XQ context patterns are templates for context instances whose immediate activation is 
based on activations of a variable number of instances of the same concept. The concept 
instances must have matching values at specified slots. The activation of one of these 
context instances is computed from the activation of a variable number of instances of a 
single concept. Because the pattern type is related to existential quantification, we will 
refer to such patterns as XQ context patterns. Similarly, we call a context whose pattern is 
an XQ context pattern an XQ context. 
Formally, an XQ context pattern  is a triple ( , , )Q P w= m  where: P  is a concept; w is a 
positive weight; for each j  the thj  element of integer vector m  maps the thj  slot of the 
concept (named) P  to a slot (index) of that context or is the Non-Specific Entity ID;  and 
at least one element of m is the Non-Specific Entity ID.   Observe that the number of 
Non-Specific Entity ID elements of m is equal to the reduction in arity from P  to Q . 
As before, an instance ( )( , , , )XX Qχ = g p  of an XQ context X  has a non-empty tuple 
{ }kp=p  of active, completely specified concept instances. g  serves as χ ’s bindings and 
has the same arity as X . The concept instances simultaneously unify where constrained 
to by m : for each k ,  let kb  denote the vector (tuple) of Entity IDs associated with kp ; 
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then, without conflict, for each ,k j , if [ ] 1j ≠ −m , then  [ [ ]] [ ]kj j=g m b , and [ ] 1i = −g  
for i  for which no such constraint applies.  
If X  is a context whose recognition pattern is an XQ context pattern, then an instance χ  
of X is a member of the set of context instances maintained by the Context Recognizer if 
and only if there is no way to add an active concept instance meeting the second criterion  
to χ ’s concept instances { }kp  and have the result meet the last criterion. Intuitively, this 
again means that the Context Recognizer maintains all the context instances and that each 
takes into account all the cues it can without being inconsistent. 
Example 
Let the concept attacks be as in the previous examples, and similarly, let Under-attack be 
a unary XQ context having the pattern (Under-attack)Q = {attacks,1,{-1,0}}. Suppose that 
attacks(55,13) and attacks(56,13) are active concept instances.    
We verify that {Under-attack, {13}, (Under-attack)Q , {attacks(55,13),attacks(56,13)} } is a 
valid instance of Under-attack.  
• {attacks(55,13),attacks(56,13)}  is non-empty; 
• attacks(55,13)  and attacks(56,13) are instances of the concept attacks;  
• {13} contains one element, and Under-attack is unary 
• the Non-Specific Entity ID (-1) does not appear in either attacks(55,13)  or  
attacks(56,13); and 
• m = {-1,0},  and 0 1[ [1]] [0] 13 [1] [1]= = = =g m g b b . 
We observe that the slots of P  that Q  do not map to any slot of X are effectively 
existentially quantified away. For example, the XQ pattern type enables to us to take the 
concept “ x  eats y ” and create patterns for “ x  eats something” and “something eats x .”  
When the Context Recognizer is updating the activation of an instance χ of a context X , 
the immediate activation expression including inhibitory bias ( )Xβ  is 
 ( )immed ( ) max * ( ) ,0 .
X
k
k
a w a pχ β⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∑  
Bias is particularly useful in supporting XQ patterns that roughly correspond to there 
being at least a desired number of active instances of a certain concept. For example, if 
the average activation level of a perceived instance of a given concept is 1, then we can 
use a weight of 1 and a bias of 1m −  in the XQ-type context pattern for there being m  
perceived instances of that concept. 
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As is the case with cue vector context patterns, computation of the gross activation level 
of χ  is based on applying an activation function to immed ( )a χ  and then applying a 
normalized leaky integrator to the result. 
2.3.3 Multiple Associative and Recognition Layers 
For a cognitive model to be psychologically plausible, it must allow recognition of one 
context to be a cue for recognition of another context. SCREAM includes a mechanism 
that enables the activation level of a context instance to set the input activation level of a 
concept instance identified with it (Note that one motivation for the distinction between 
concepts and contexts is that the processes for context recognition and spreading 
activation, etc., seem to occur in different frequency bands). This functionality is 
implemented in the context concept driver module. For example, recognition of the 
context instance Party {54} could determine the raw activation level of the concept 
instance Party {54}, which in turn could be a cue for the context BirthdayParty {54}. 
Thus, cognitive models that include hierarchical or cascaded context recognition can be 
supported. The Semantic Memory and Context Recognition components of a SCREAM 
model thus can act together as a type of dynamically-structured, multi-layer neural 
network, where the structure of the network is updated according to instantiations of 
concepts and contexts.  
SCREAM allows a context instance to be tracked when the subset of activated cues 
(concept instances) for or against it has activation, even when not all of its slots are 
bound to entity identifiers. Thus, cognitive models in SCREAM can recognize partially 
formed context instances. Furthermore, SCREAM allows context recognition patterns 
that are recurrent individually or as a set. Thus, it should be easy to see that SCREAM 
allows cognitive models with context recognition capability greater than that of 
multilayer perceptrons.  
We note that the psychological plausibility of multiple layers of context recognition and 
sets of context recognition patterns that include recurrence has not been documented by 
the psychologists on our team and requires further investigation. It is important to note 
that while strings in SCREAM representation enable convenient interaction with people 
and other system components, strings are not fundamental to cognitive processing in 
SCREAM. 
2.4 Modeling Emotion, Attitudes, and Culture  
Converging lines of research suggest that a person’s attitude (which is a general opinion 
towards a person, object, or concept) influences their behavior. A general theory 
supporting this research, theory of planned behavior, proposes that behaviors are 
influenced by attitudes towards a specific behavior, the subjective norms associated with 
acting out that behavior, and the perception that this behavior is within a person’s control. 
This forms an action intention state, which then typically drives that person’s actual 
behavior (Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Fishbein & Stasson, 1990; Madden, Ellen, & Ajzen, 
1992). For example, if one has the attitude that being a suicide bomber will ultimately 
help the community and thus is a good thing, believing the community treats suicide 
bombers as heroes, and believing he or she can perform the act of being a suicide 
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bomber, then that person is more likely to form the intent to be a suicide bomber. 
Whether one actually becomes a suicide bomber depends on several environmental and 
psychological factors, such as any intervening events (e.g., police detecting the bomb, 
etc) and the person’s emotion state at the time.  
A person’s emotional state often plays a large role in a determining the ultimate behavior 
of the individual. According to the research by Berkowitz (1993) and others, certain 
experiences may create general negative affects (such as the fight or flight impulse when 
a threat is perceived), which then may stimulate associations linked to fear and anger. 
How people ultimately respond can be a result of both goal- or moral-related decisions 
and their perceived emotion state. As mentioned above, assessments of a person’s 
environment and the potential outcome can also temper their behaviors. Consequently, an 
angry person might refrain from being aggressive if this aggression conflicts with their 
goals or moral values. Accordingly, they may choose other behaviors that more closely 
align with their goals or values (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; 
Huesmann, 1988). Using the example above, a person may want to explode a bomb on a 
bus. If the ticket agent for the bus angers him, he has a choice; either expresses his anger 
or control himself and board the bus. Normally his goal might be to express his anger, but 
today his higher-level goal is to avoid drawing attention to himself before he boards the 
bus. Therefore, the person recognizes and suppresses his anger before proceeding to 
board the bus. A large amount of research supports the notion that attitudes, norms, 
emotions, goals, and the perception of control helps drive actual behaviors. In fact, the 
theories that support this research have been successfully used to predict a wide range of 
behaviors, such as voting, shoplifting, gun-related violent acts, and other moral and 
ethical decisions (Kurland, 1995; Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 1988).  
The HI framework corresponds to the theories and supporting research mentioned above. 
As a cognitive character perceives his or her environment, their perceptions in the form 
of contexts are influenced by a hierarchy of higher-level goals or moral states. For 
example, one goal may be to protect his family, while a lower-level goal may be to work 
hard to buy new clothing. Supporting the higher-level goals are the intermediate goal 
states. Intermediate goals help support the higher-level goals by breaking down the goals 
into discrete-level tasks. As a consequence, the intended actions are a product of both the 
intermediate goals and the current emotional state of the simulated human. This 
emotional state may dynamically change—for example from very low to very high levels 
of anger—if the perceptions change.  
Continuing with the previous example, the cognitive character may see a western woman 
without a veil (hijab), which perturbs his emotional state toward increased anger. He may 
also see a police officer, which increases his fear. When the police officer leaves, his 
level of fear may subside due to the removal of his perceived source of fear. However, 
depending on the salience or emotional relevance, the cognitive character may stay angry 
due to the presence of the western woman. Having a high level of anger may increase the 
likelihood of carrying out the goal of bombing a bus. Conversely, having a high amount 
of fear of getting caught by the police officer may cause the simulated human to postpone 
his actions. The actions that are ultimately chosen stem from his current emotional state 
and their correspondence to the actions that contribute to his most important goals.  
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Figure 3. The process diagram of the cognitive actions within the HI framework 
 
 
In the HI framework, an impression of culture can be generated by varying a simulated 
human’s emotional response to particular perceptions, such as the above example where a 
women wearing a somewhat revealing, western-style outfit might stimulate a more 
intense anger response in certain cultures. Cultures also exhibit variations within their 
high-level and intermediate goals. As a result, their intended and actual behaviors will 
show cultural uniqueness (see Figure 3). The result is a complex set of behaviors that 
have certain emergent properties that are common to a particular group. As noted, these 
behaviors are not programmed directly, but develop as a result of the inter-relationships 
between the perceptions and goals of the cultural group being modeled. Thus, simulated 
Americans (or any nationality or ethnic group) could perceive, think, and act with a 
similarity corresponding to a common “culture.” Consequently, a simulated American 
will act and “think” differently than another simulated nationality under similar 
conditions.  
2.5 Dynamic Emotion States 
2.5.1 Scientific Basis for Direct Route 
Research has shown that early in stimulus processing, the fear/surprise emotional centers 
of the brain (amygdala) receive direct input about the potential significance of a stimulus 
(Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; LeDoux, 1996). The “direct 
route” conveys a fast, rough impression of the situation because it uses a sub-cortical 
pathway in which no high-level cognition is involved. At the same time, stimulus 
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information is processed via another information pathway to allow for a deeper, cognitive 
assessment of this information. This “indirect route” allows for more deliberate 
assessments of the situation. The multiple pathways enable both an initial, fast response 
as well as the integration of emotion with higher-level recognition and understanding. 
The memory process output is appraised for its emotional meaning through which a 
behavioral assessment is made (Phelps, 1996).  
One useful way to think about direct types of responses is that they are action tendencies 
that have evolved to make it possible to deal more effectively with prototypic situations. 
A negative affect such as fear has evolved to mobilize the physiological resources 
necessary to make a quick and effective behavioral response to a perceived threat. This is 
opposed to “feelings,” which are the subjective awareness of an emotional response (the 
presence of an action tendency). Conversely, “emotion” does not necessarily involve an 
awareness of such an action tendency. Fear, as an action tendency that has evolved to 
deal with threat, is often useful in mobilizing the body to deal with a perceived threat. 
Evidence for a direct pathway has been found by Pare, Quirk, & LeDoux, 2004; and 
others (e.g., Marsh, Fuzessery, Grose, & Wenstrup, 2002), by injecting anterograde and 
retrograde tracers in animals at physiologically defined sites within the amygdala to view 
axon pathways. The results provide evidence of a rapid thalamo-amygdalocollicular 
feedback circuit that imposes emotional content onto the processing of sensory stimuli at 
a direct pathway level— permitting a human to respond to potentially harmful stimuli 
before it is fully assessed (LeDoux, 1996). Other evidence supporting the conclusion that 
emotional information is separate from semantic information is the finding that 
perceptual representations of objects, and the evaluation of their emotional significance, 
are separately processed by the brain. In fact, brain damaged people often lose the ability 
to appraise the emotional significance of certain stimuli without loss of the ability to 
perceive the same stimuli as objects (Phelps, 2006). 
As with humans, cognitive models should incorporate the ability to react quickly to 
certain stimuli without the need first to deliberate the degree of threat. In the HI 
framework, this psychological phenomenon was modeled such that the cognitive 
characters exhibit defensive reactions of fear in response to perceived stimuli that 
represent potential dangers and/or anger towards certain perceived events or actions. 
Specifically, the cognitive characters have responses representing the direct route, in that 
it essentially represents the reflexive thalamo-amygdala pathway that bypasses the cortex. 
This pathway exhibits fear and defensive reactions, but not other emotions such as 
happiness. Other emotions and aspects of the indirect route will be modeled in the very 
near future.  
2.5.2  Model of Emotional Processes in SCREAM and the HI Framework 
A basic capability for modeling emotional processes in cognition has been implemented 
in SCREAM. SCREAM continuously updates the level of activation of each emotion 
based on concept activation levels. While a concept is directly activated by perception as 
a result of much semantic processing, a concept may be specified to influence emotional 
state. The HI framework converts emotion levels into fuzzy-set representations that 
control cues in context-recognition patterns to influence context (pattern) recognition. 
This permits cognitive models with emotions to affect behavior of a range of semantic 
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processing involved. A minimal amount of semantic processing, rather than no semantic 
processing, is required for emotional processes to influence behavior in the present 
implementation. This is because the input of the Emotional Processes Module is the 
Semantic Memory output, and because action generation requires context recognition.  
Specifically, emotional processes parameters enable each concept to be associated with a 
level of activation and a weight for each emotion. For example, in an emotional 
parameters file, the line 
 
cee clown 2 fear 0.700 .7 anger 0.100 .9 
 
specifies that concept clown influences two emotions. It tends to push the activation level 
of fear to 0.700 with a weight of 0.7 times the activation level of clown and the level of 
anger to 0.100 with a weight of 0.9 times the activation level of clown. 
In computing the overall emotional state for the model, the emotional processes module 
takes as input the overall activation levels of all concepts. For each concept the net 
weight of its effect on the level of an emotion is the product of that concept’s activation 
and its weight coefficient for that emotion. In the updated emotion state, the activation 
level of an emotion is the centroid (weighted average) for that emotion computed from 
the net weights and emotion activation levels associated with each concept and that 
emotion. 
The scalar representation of the activation level of emotion is translated into membership 
levels in fuzzy sets to enable emotional state to influence context recognition using the 
cue-pattern mechanism. For example, the activation level of the emotion anger can be 
represented by membership levels in the three fuzzy sets lowAnger, medAnger, and 
highAnger that cover the range of anger activation levels. In the current HI Framework 
implementation where emotions have a range of [0,1], Gaussian fuzzy set representations 
are used. For example, an anger level of 0.25 translates to membership levels of 0.468 
lowAnger, 0.468 medAnger, and 0.063 highAnger. These membership levels are fed back 
into SCREAM to control the activation levels of the concept instances lowAnger, 
medAnger, and highAnger, which can be used as cues in context (pattern) recognition. 
The HI project created SCREAM’s emotional state computational capability to model the 
direct route emotions of fear and anger. Concepts in the HI framework’s Cognitive 
Perception category influence emotional state. Contexts in the HI framework’s Action-
Intent category include emotion-driven cues in their recognition patterns. 
In addition, the HI framework includes an Emotion Regulator Graphical User Interface 
(GUI) that enables a user to directly control (increase or decrease) the emotional state of 
a cognitive character, overriding SCREAM’s emotional state computation. Thus, if a user 
is interested in examining the behaviors of a specific cognitive character as a result of 
that character becoming rapidly more (or less) fearful or angry he or she can do so. This 
allows users to initiate simple “what-if” scenarios related to specific situation events. The 
image shown in Figure 4, depicts the emotion GUI where the user can control the 
emotion state of a particular cognitive character. In the GUI, fear and anger values are 
shown in percentages (i.e., 25 corresponds to 0.25), and scalar values from the GUI for 
the emotions are translated into fuzzy set values described above. 
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Figure 4. The Emotion Regulator GUI 
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3 Modeling Visual, Spatial, and Motor Functioning 
In addition to semantic functioning, the SNL cognitive framework includes elements of 
spatial, visual representation, and motor functions. These functions permit a much more 
accurate M&S and training environment in that actual humans could conceivably train 
against (or with) cognitive characters via augmented reality and virtual reality 
environments, as well as in highly realistic simulated environments. 
3.1 Visual Representation Simulation 
In humans, representations of visual information are rapidly constructed in a hierarchical 
sequence of processing levels. Processing begins with features, such as edges, colors, 
textures, and their relations. This feature information is then bound together into 
meaningful composite proto-object entities, such as objects and surfaces. These entities 
can then be collapsed into larger scene entities, forming object groups and relations 
between objects and surfaces (Zeki, 1993). A representation of a scene is subsequently 
formed and quickly becomes symbolic (within semantic memory). As a result, scene 
representations are, by and large, accurate abstractions of the environment within 
semantic memory (Sanocki, 2003). The visual information is then split into two 
independent processing streams. One stream manages perception of “things,” while the 
other manages visuomotor actions (Rensink, 2000). 
In the HI framework, cognitive characters are able to perceive visual stimuli from their 
environment. As the scene changes so do their perceptions regarding that environment 
(and consequently their behavior). This capability roughly corresponds to the assessment 
of abstract visual representations, described above. Specifically, in the HI framework 
visual perception produces semantic and spatial information that is used as input to 
subsequent stages of the cognitive model. Visual perception is currently fairly 
straightforward in that it is based on robotic sensor simulation and computer game 
techniques. Future implementations could be based on detailed simulation of human 
visual perception—when that modeling capability becomes sufficiently fast and is 
needed. 
Concept instances whose raw activation is driven by perception are used as cues to 
recognize contexts that cognitive characters can understand. Spatial information is used 
to help navigate and establish the location of objects or characters within their 
environment. The simulated process of “visual perception” and subsequent “attention” to 
environmental cues includes recognizing objects, properties and relationships, including 
what direction other cognitive characters are gazing. The simulated visual perception 
builds upon the visual sensor modeling framework previously existing in the Umbra 
Packages sensor library. In the current HI implementation, a viewer can only access 
descriptor tags of a target entity if viewing frustum and line-of-sight criteria are met. 
While the current gaze estimation mechanism relies on a symbolic “gazes at” relational 
tag, better fidelity in modeling the eye and head motions of cognitive characters would 
enable us to pursue a more geometry-based model incorporating viewing distance, visual 
angle, and how long the observed gazer is in the modeled character’s visual frustum.  
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A proposed performance optimization to this latter model (written but untested software) 
uses a specialized visual property descriptor to model what a character might appear to be 
gazing at or scanning. This will reduce the work that an observer’s visual perception 
module must do to compute plausible targets—e.g., estimate what is in the actor’s foveal 
region. Thus, by using inputs from cognitive character visual sensors, cognitive 
characters can recognize what room they are in, where it is located relative to other 
rooms, the layout of each room, and generally react to stimuli in the environment that 
they see. In addition, if an entity’s perception can tell what concept an object is 
associated with, their Object Recognition system will allow new concepts to be created. 
For example, an entity can recognize a chair and that it belongs in a specific room. 
3.2 Role of Spatial Memory and Awareness 
Carrying out certain behaviors, such as finding a bus terminal, requires spatial situation 
awareness. Spatial situation awareness is achieved via several visuo-spatial systems. 
According to current models of human visuo-spatial cognition, once visual information is 
acquired it is sent to both egocentric and allocentric reference systems. The egocentric 
system remembers the relative position (body or head) of the observer as that person 
navigates through his/her environment (e.g., remembering the path to your car). The 
allocentric system, on the other hand, remembers the position of objects with respect to 
other objects irrespective of an observer (for example, remembering that a book is on a 
table in the other room). The allocentric system selects particular, environmentally-
defined references in which object positions are remembered partly in terms of larger 
spatial groupings or regions. These groupings are usually defined by the relations among 
a number of different objects. Spatial relations are coded in terms of vectors indicating 
the relative direction and distance between locations (Werner & Schmidt, 2000). 
Egocentric and allocentric reference systems may be used at different levels of spatial 
memory. According to Sholl (1995), spatial information is stored in an allocentric 
reference system. The information is then retrieved by superimposing an egocentric 
reference system depending on the position that is physically or mentally taken by the 
observer (Werner & Schmidt, 2000). 
Spatial representations are partially hierarchical in nature. That is, spatial relations are 
encoded between locations in different regions of an environment according to a graph-
theoretic tree. Partially hierarchical representations contain redundancy such that many 
spatial relations will be stored explicitly. The principal advantage of this redundancy is 
the increased speed and accuracy with which certain spatial judgments can be performed. 
The advantage follows from the assumption that, at least in many cases, knowledge 
encoded in memory can be retrieved faster and more accurately than the same knowledge 
could be inferred from other knowledge in memory (evidence from spatial relationship 
errors). For example, people often erroneously believe Reno is further east than San 
Diego (McNamara, 1986). 
Evidence supporting the partially hierarchical structure is the finding that locations in the 
same region prime each other more than locations in different regions. This indicates that 
locations in the same region were “closer” in the subjects’ memories than locations in 
different regions, regardless of the actual Euclidean distance. This backs the idea that 
different regions of an environment are stored in different branches of a partially 
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hierarchical mental representation. People also use regional information (category 
knowledge) to judge relative position when that knowledge is available and useful 
(McNamara, 1986; McNamara, Hardy, & Hirtle, 1989).  
 
 
 
Figure 5. A diagram of spatial functioning in the HI framework 
 
In the HI framework, spatial knowledge draws upon spatial memory to help determine 
the most efficient path a cognitive character should take in order to move from point A to 
point B (see Figure 5). The spatial knowledge/memory component consists of egocentric 
(body centered) and allocentric (global) spatial memory, cognitive mapping of the 
environment, and memory representation of objects in the environment. The current 
model assumes perceptual synthesis of large spaces such as rooms. The spatial system 
integrates these spaces into a hierarchical representation indicating adjacent rooms and 
their contents. Perceiving and moving about the environment thus builds up the spatial 
knowledge and awareness, which includes the current location and velocity of the 
cognitive entity and of perceived items. The Spatial system then uses that location, along 
with the stored hierarchy and cognitive map, to establish paths to given objectives. For 
example, in Figure 6 the spatial system perceives items that are represented by blue and 
red boxes. The blue boxes indicate a perceived medium to low level of interest. The red 
boxes indicate a perceived high level of interest.  
The Egocentric Reference System (ERS) component takes inputs from visual/spatial 
perception and identifies which perceptions correspond to items already in egocentric 
spatial memory. Any corresponding spatial records are updated with velocity estimates 
and are available for export to situational awareness or other higher functions. Items not 
found in the egocentric spatial memory are added to it. The entire set of objects that was 
originally fed in from perception is then sent out to the Allocentric Reference System 
(ARS) which looks at each to see if there is a matching concept instance. The ARS 
module then creates spatial records for any items which have only concept instances but 
not spatial records (Concept instances and spatial records are linked so ARS can always 
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find one from the other). The ARS then updates the location of any spatial objects which 
have moved with respect to fixed coordinates, and exports the updated items to ERS for 
the next round. 
Currently, the concepts of ‘adjacent’ and ‘contained’ are implemented. Likewise, new 
structures such as ‘left of’ would be relatively easy to add. Work needs to be done in 
modeling how humans determine weak adjacency (e.g., table and chair), rather than 
topological adjacency (e.g., room, portal, room). Other problems include modeling how a 
human looks into a building and recognizes whether he has been in it before, or how to 
recognize regions demarked by features rather than walls, etc. This would entail 
modeling the dynamic creation of frames from the landmarks within a region of the 
environment rather than relying upon the frames being a part of the environment model 
itself, or being generated by an external perceptual synthesis component. 
Updates to the simulation infrastructure are not currently compatible with the previously 
implemented Egocentric Spatial Memory and Allocentric Spatial Memory modules.  
Efforts are underway to re-integrate them with the updated simulation infrastructure.  The 
current demonstrations use a spatial memory capability that is based on maps for robotics 
and embodied-agent simulations. This spatial memory supports many key capabilities of 
the combined Egocentric and Allocentric Spatial Memories, but it currently makes no 
effort to be psychologically-plausible. Using outputs from modules simulating visual 
sensing and perception, our cognitive character humans can recognize or recall the room 
in which they are located; where that room is located relative to other rooms; layout of 
each room; and generally react to stimuli in the environment that they see. Concept 
instances can be recognized if an entity’s perception can tell which concept an object is 
associated with. The cognitive character humans can also approximate body location and 
recognize objects as types and recall them from previous encounters if they are known 
and recognized perceptually. General distance, direction, and orientation can also be 
determined. Robot planning and simulation software enables the characters to navigate to 
desired locations without collisions. Once updated, the Egocentric and Allocentric Spatial 
Memory modules can serve as a foundation for psychologically plausible models of the 
following: 
 Spatiotopic Mapping – Allows cognitive characters to approximate body location, 
recognize objects as types, and spontaneously recall them from previous 
encounters if they are known. 
 Categorical Relations – Allows cognitive characters to relate a landmark to where 
they are relative to the landmark (For example, I see the fire extinguisher and I 
know it is in the hallway in a particular building, so I must be in the hallway in 
that building). 
 Coordinate Relations – Allows cognitive characters to compute their general 
distance, direction, and orientation. 
 Spatial Associative Memory – Allows cognitive characters to match stored 
information about the location, name, and function of other object(s) in the visual 
scene in terms of partial hierarchies (For example, the knowledge that a particular 
room is in a particular building). 
 Path planning – Uses a combination of semantic, topological and metric 
information from the spatial memory model to generate path plans in terms of a 
combination of semantic, topological and metric information.  
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Figure 6. A representation of the spatial perception of the HI cognitive models 
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4 Modeling Motion Control 
Generally, in humans stimuli are first identified either visually or through various other 
senses. The information associated with the stimuli is quickly identified via an automatic 
process. Once there is identification, a specific response is selected (in approximately 
300ms). The selected motor response (which is often a chunked series of motor 
movements) is then enacted. This entire process typically takes approximately 500ms 
(Schmidt & Wrisberg, 2004). Within the HI framework, a cognitive character’s actions 
and the behavior of others will feed back into its environmental perceptions. These, in 
turn, will be fed back into the framework for processing and actions.  
The sub-framework that integrates semantic processing with simulated physical action 
generation is described below (Recall the diagram in Figure 3). The Behavioral Actions 
module in the HI framework uses SCREAM’s Context Recognizer to compute activation 
levels of instances of SCREAM contexts that are associated with action scripts. The 
Context to Abstract Action module updates the action script selection based on the 
activation levels of these context instances, with the constraint that the action script can 
be instantiated. Currently, this means that the Semantic and Spatial Memory modules 
must contain concept instance and entity information that satisfies the script. Script 
instantiation can include requirements for specific concept instances, partially instantiated 
concepts, or any instance of particular concepts. 
Behaviors to carry out instantiated action scripts are controlled by a hierarchical state 
machine (Action State Machine). When a new action script instance is selected, the start 
state of the state machine program corresponding to the script is instantiated with the 
appropriate data and run on the state machine. State machine programs include 
commands that interface with the Cognitive Model and with the Human Taskable 
subsystem. This subsystem integrates the simulated human sensing and perception model 
with path control and the simulated physical human model. The current simulated 
physical human model is based on Boston Dynamics’ DI Guy®, which combines robot-
like control with a motion-loop manager and a library of captured motions to generate 
realistic-looking motion. Thus, the Action State Machine corresponds to Executive Motor 
Functioning, while the Human Taskable handles Effector Motor Functioning. 
Currently, the physical behaviors of the cognitive characters are initially created by 
motion capture tools that allow them to move and react in a manner that is generally 
realistic. Their actions are, in turn, strung together and run by a motion loop manager. 
Scheduled improvements to the HI framework will include modeling and simulating the 
effects of physical fatigue on the cognitive character human’s actions, as well as 
implementing accurate reaction times in response to stimuli. 
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5 Development of Cognitive Characters 
To create a specific cognitive character, both the stimuli (environmental cues) and 
contextual associations (perceptions, activations, and states (shown in Figure 3) need to 
be composed. This is done by first cataloging a series of low-level environmental cues 
that the cognitive character might perceive in a given scenario (see Appendix A). As with 
humans, certain concepts may prime other concepts. To specify priming in the 
framework, the modeler generates a series of cue-to-cue relationships with a certain 
degree of activation—i.e., activation from Cue1 primes Cue2 with a weight of 0.8. 
 In addition, the modeler may compose perception-to-cue priming (discussed below) with 
a specified degree of activation using the same procedure as cue-to-cue priming. When a 
certain number of cues that fall within a pre-defined cluster are activated, a context 
associated with that cluster is activated. A context is used to describe the “mental” 
processes that occur when we try to make sense of, and interact with, our environment. 
These processes can be broken down into perceptional context or “perception” and “goal” 
states. 
A specific perception that is active at any given time is the result of a particular pattern of 
concepts (i.e., cues) that are activated. Perceptions seek to “clarify” a current situation.   
(For example, “One soldier is moving near me for a purpose other than to buy my 
merchandise”; see Appendix B). To create a perception, the modeler lists a series of 
concepts associated with a particular perception, as well as the degree of activation. The 
result of an activated perception is the priming of a series of potential intermediate-goal 
states. 
The intermediate, sub-goal state(s) that are primed will become activated if they are 
relevant to the current environmental situation (see Appendix C). Accordingly, to activate 
the intermediate goals, pre-determined cues from the environment must be present. To 
accomplish this, the modeler creates a list of intermediate-goal states. Each intermediate 
goal state is associated with environmental cues and its level of cue activation. If the cues 
that are present in the environment do not match up with the pre-determined cue set, then 
the primed intermediate goal will not become activated.  
As noted, each intermediate-goal state is associated with a hierarchy of increasingly 
abstract-level goals (such as “protect family,” being the highest of the goals). If two or 
more primed goal-states are active, the highest of these states will be chosen. The sub-
goal that is selected will activate a corresponding action intention state. Action intentions 
bind emotional affect with behaviors. In the HI framework, there are currently two 
emotions that are exhibited, fear and anger. Both emotions can vary in intensity from 
very high to medium to very low. This is done by assigning a fear and anger value to 
each perception that the cognitive character might encounter (see Appendix D). Thus the 
degree and type of emotion state that is exhibited will be dynamic, resulting in what a 
cognitive character perceives at any given moment (see section 2.5). Currently, emotions 
directly effect only the selection of behavior (The next iteration of the framework will 
have emotions dynamically affect the context of the simulated human).  
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The next step for the modeler is to assign an action appropriate to the various levels of 
fear and anger (high, medium, or low) that a cognitive character experiences as a result of 
its perceived context (see Appendix E). For example, if a character is very angry it will 
select a behavior associated with being very angry. If the cognitive character is both very 
angry and very fearful it may select another action. The resulting combination produces a 
particular action script for this emotion state. Each action script consists of a coded 
sequence of behaviors (see Appendix F). After the behaviors are played out the character 
will reassess the environment and follow new behaviors based on new perceptions. 
The entering of cues, perceptions, and states are typically done manually, often through 
manual knowledge elicitation. Thus, if a modeler seeks to have a cognitive character that 
represents a particular culture or region, then he or she may simply interview someone 
from that culture or region and have them assign values to the cues, perceptions, and 
states. Another method of knowledge capture that is being pioneered at SNL is the use of 
automatic knowledge capture techniques. While still in its infancy, SNL is developing 
ways to automatically capture information via text and mass media to populate aspects of 
a cognitive model without human intervention.  
Additional work is required to convert the received information into models that can be 
used by SCREAM. This work includes determining the slot structure (roles of entities) 
within concepts and contexts; the cognitive process of recognizing cues (e.g., Cue1,…, 
Cue50) from concept instances directly activated by, for example, visual perception, 
which is modeled by additional concepts and contexts. Moreover, in other stages of the 
framework, what appear to be simple patterns for recognition in the model are 
decomposed into several layers of pattern recognition where tuning of parameters is 
required, and if implemented state-machine programs (“motion control”) matching the 
high-level descriptions are not available, they need to be written. This need should 
decrease as the library of action programs grows. 
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6 Display and Example of Cognitive Functions 
One of the capabilities produced by the HI LDRD is the ability to dynamically display 
the recognized cues, their general perceptions associated with those cues, high- and 
intermediate-goal states, emotion states, action intentions, and the final actions of the 
cognitive characters. This permits easier software and modeling bug corrections as well 
as allowing participants to observe what each cognitive character “perceives” and 
“thinks.” As a cognitive character perceives or thinks about the events occurring in its 
environment, this process is visualized in the Visualization Graphical User Interface 
(GUI; see Figure 7).  
 
 
 
Figure 7. SNL cognitive model process Visualization GUI Display 
 
 
In this GUI, non-activated states are expressed in blue. As each concept, goal, or state 
becomes more active the color shifts from a blue state to a red state, depending on its 
level of activation. Each of the concept, goal, or state elements has an assigned number 
Sell Merchandise
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which are associated with a particular activation description. For example, within the 
Cues/Concepts box, C47 is associated with the concept that no US soldier is currently 
seen (see Appendix A). Within the Intermediate Goal State box, SG5 is associated with 
the intermediate goal of conversing with a nearby person (see Appendix C). Moreover, as 
the cognitive characters perceive stimuli from the environment they will have dynamic 
emotion states of both fear and anger. The Visualization GUI will display both those 
emotion states as they occur in real-time. These cognitive processes are also expressed in 
the scenario’s display that exhibits the final cognitive character behaviors (see Figure 8). 
In this display, players can indirectly interact with the cognitive characters by means of 
manipulating the actions of non-cognitive characters via voice commands. The scenario 
environment can be dynamic in that multiple, non-cognitive characters can have different 
interactions with the cognitive characters depending on the player commands as well on 
as actions of other non-cognitive entities (e.g., automated, semi-random pedestrian 
behaviors).  
6.1 Scenario Example 
The HI project produced two main demonstrations of its capabilities. The scenario for the 
first demo pertained to an office environment in which three cognitive characters 
attempted to steal documents from a file locked in a safe. The second demo pertained to a 
marketplace environment in which three cognitive characters interact with solders 
controlled by players. The second demo is substantially more complex than the first and 
is discussed below.  
In the second demo, player encounters a scene containing a busy marketplace in Iraqi 
town filled with shoppers, cars, and a small team of US soldiers patrolling on foot (see 
Figure 8). The behaviors of the soldiers are controlled by a player and can be manipulated 
via voice and/or joystick commands.  
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Figure 8. An example of the scenario environment (scenario environment  
courtesy of Lockheed Martin Corporation) 
 
 
In the scenario, a player commands a group of soldiers to search for a suspected weapons 
cache near one of the market stands. The soldiers are essentially scripted entities with 
some low-level behavior control. A player can order by name one, several, or all of his or 
her troops to investigate a particular vender stand. Near one of the stands is a 58-year old 
vender owner and his 28-year old nephew. The vender is a cognitive character in which 
his “cognition” and behaviors are controlled by a cognitive model that will enable him to 
respond dynamically to the actions of the soldiers. The number of soldiers, their 
behaviors, and their gender will affect the vender’s behaviors. For example, if the vender 
feels threatened (i.e., receives cues that form the perception of being threatened) then he 
may become aggressive or flee. If he is angered, he may become confrontational and very 
angry. This will result if his current perceptions are associated with a high-level anger 
emotion. If he is both fearful and angry he may respond with a different behavior. Factors 
that determine the vender’s behavior are both the perceived context and the degree and 
type of emotion that is currently active (which is dynamically generated by what stimuli 
are perceived from the environment). In addition, automobiles and pedestrians moving 
about in the marketplace can passively affect the ongoing situation to a certain extent. 
In the scenario the vender is hiding a weapons cache under his merchandise. The 
nearness of the US soldiers and how they behave toward the vender will generally 
determine his actions. For instance, if the US soldiers move near the weapons cache and 
are threatening the vender, he will signal his nephew to fire on the US soldiers (see 
Figure 9).  
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Figure 9. An example of a cognitive character (blue shirt in the background)  
and a non-cognitive character (soldier).  
 
 
Near another stand, two cognitive characters, a husband and wife vender, are also trying 
to sell their merchandise. Both of these characters are generally hospitable. The male 
vender is most intent on selling his merchandise by vigorously calling people to come see 
his wares. The wife is more intent on talking with her female friend (who is a non-
cognitive character) than seeking to sell their merchandise (see Figure 10). As the two 
venders see the US soldiers they become more distressed. This may be exhibited by the 
female vender ending her conversation with her friend and the male vender becoming 
more formal. How the soldiers interact with the venders will determine how successful 
they are in interrogating them to determine if the venders are actually hiding weapons. 
That is, like actual humans, the cognitive characters respond very well to culturally 
appropriate gestures and greetings. If the soldiers give the proper greeting, exchange 
pleasantries, and follow social norms when speaking to the male and female pair (i.e., 
generating socially positive cues), then the venders will become more relaxed (i.e., low 
level of anger/fear).  
Moreover, since the players playing the role of the soldiers may want to question both the 
male and female vender, a way to do this without offending the their culture (i.e., 
generating socially negative cues) would be to have a male soldier ask the male vender 
for permission to have a female soldier to speak to his wife. If cultural norms are 
followed, the soldier will receive all the information they need. If some or none of the 
cultural rules are followed, then the soldiers will receive little or none of the information 
they seek. The need to be culturally appropriate with respect to genders also applies to the 
first, 58 year-old vender. That is, if the female soldier interrogates this vender he will be 
especially angry because of his perception of a violation of gender roles. This perceived 
insult will increase the likelihood of him behaving in a more aggressive manner.  
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Figure 10. Vender wife cognitive character (on right) 
 
 
Throughout the demo, players are able to affect the potential actions of the cognitive 
characters by making specific decision choices for the soldiers. As discussed above, the 
makeup of the group and how the soldiers interact with the venders will affect the 
outcome of the interrogation. Currently, work is being done to increase the complexity of 
this demo by adding the number of decision points a player must make, as well as 
increasing the number of environmental variables that impacts both the soldiers and the 
venders. In addition, a greater range of verbal communications between the soldiers and 
the venders is being added to increase the demo’s realism.  
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7 Applications and Future Directions 
The benefits of using this framework are: 1) that it produces a psychologically and 
sociologically reasonable computational framework of human behavior, 2) each 
cognitive model can be tailored to specific individuals, 3) the cognitive characters 
operate autonomously and do not require human operators to run the simulation, and 4) it 
is interoperable in larger M&S portfolios for systems studies and experimentation. 
7.1 Potential Applications 
As discussed, there are many potential application areas for the HI framework. One of the 
more obvious areas is training. As stated in the magazine, Simulation & Training, 
“combat scenarios today are highly complex, and [simulations] must reflect how 
political, military and economic developments can shape a conflict” (2005, p. 47). 
Consequently, a potential benefit of using a training simulation with the HI framework is 
greater psychological realism. The cognitive characters could incorporate cognitive 
models of foreign adversaries, including the mindset, behaviors, and training typical of a 
particular country or regional area. In addition models of adversaries could be created 
from domain experts, thereby increasing the realism and effectiveness of the training. 
Since the HI models do not require an actual human to drive their behaviors, participants 
may repeatedly train at little cost per training exercise. Furthermore, for training 
applications the level of trainee understanding could be assessed by automatically 
generating a mental model of the student as he/she trains against the cognitive character. 
Trainers could compare/contrast this model with a domain expert’s mental model of the 
most efficient/appropriate means to complete the task. 
Other application areas include Concept of Operations (ConOps) and tactics 
development. The use of HI models could provide forces with additional tools for dealing 
with an evolving threat through action/counter-action forward simulations. Cognitive 
characters could be created that simulates friendly/adversarial behaviors. For example, 
there could be a situation that threatens the security of the facility (such as an angry 
protest crowd—possibly like the US Embassy in Iran, circa 1979). The response force 
could use the potential tactics development capability to help predict tactical behaviors 
several generations before they occur. This would provide an environment to evolve new 
threat understandings and to provide red/blue-force reasoning engine. 
 Other applications involve developing population models. The HI models could forward 
simulate the movements and general behaviors of large groups of individuals in response 
to US soldier actions, etc. This would be useful in helping predict population responses to 
the transportation and/or protecting of sensitive materiel. In addition, HI models could 
help predict the cumulative economic effect on people resulting from natural disasters or 
terrorist events (further discussed in future research directions below). Related to this is 
the area of behavior forecasting. While this is a long-term goal, one could imagine that in 
the future cognitive characters will have the psychological, sociological, and cultural 
similarity to humans so as to fairly accurately forecast specific human perceptions, 
attitudes, and behaviors within changing environments. To accomplish this, both the 
depth and breadth of human modeling fidelity would need to be substantially increased, 
along with framework modifications to enable scaling to very large populations.  
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7.2 Future Research Directions 
The HI LDRD effort served as the impetus for greater R&D work in the area of human 
modeling. However, this effort should only be considered a first step in a long trek. 
Multiple projects are currently underway that support and extend the human modeling 
work. One of these efforts, the Human Memory and Reasoning for Scientific Study 
LDRD (07-0610), is working to improve and extend the current framework by supporting 
further work in modeling memory, information conceptualization, and emotion, as well 
as including aspects of human reasoning by FY2009. Assisting in this effort are leading 
experts in the field of psychology, neuroscience, and computational fields of intelligence. 
Their role is to help integrate the latest research and robust theories of memory, emotion, 
concept formation, and reasoning into a single computational architecture. Specifically, 
the framework will integrate semantic (facts-based) and episodic (event-based) 
memories, as well as basic emotion (state and trait) and reasoning (deductive, inductive, 
and abductive—i.e., hypothesis generation) in a single architecture. Research and 
experiments will be conducted to empirically validate both the psychological architecture 
and theories behind the architecture, while highlighting future enhancement 
opportunities.  
In addition, the LDRD project, Cognitive Modeling of Human Behaviors within Socio-
Economic Systems (06-1102), is working to scale the number of cognitive characters to at 
least 10,000 entities, along with modeling economic, cultural, and stress-induced 
behaviors by FY2008. The goal of this project is to develop a science-based cognitive 
modeling framework of the individual-level economic decision-making that is critical to 
national economic security. Specifically, this project is developing a defensible 
neuroeconomic and cognitive science-based model of economic decision making before, 
during, and after “extreme events” such as acts of terrorism or natural disasters. By 
expanding the current state-of-the-art in modeling and simulating them in large-scale 
computing clusters SNL is working to produce high-fidelity, internally consistent 
analysis of these types of events on the economy and public confidence.  
Furthermore, the LDRD project, Game Technology Enhanced Simulation for Homeland 
Security Training (07-1219), is working to attach a gaming interface to the current 
framework. This will allow a player to play through an adaptive scenario from multiple 
perspectives, with realistic cognitive characters representing the other players. This 
project is intended to provide trainees with an immersive environment that transforms 
their intellectual knowledge into concrete experience that reinforces key learning 
objectives: situational awareness, logic validity, and decision optimality. This project will 
be finished in FY2009.  
Finally, other R&D projects (e.g., The Effects of Angry and Fearful Emotion States on 
Decision-Making LDRD, 06-1831; and The Role of Emotion and Emotion Regulation in 
Decision Making and Action in Critical Situations project) are providing support to the 
human modeling effort by funding behavioral and neuroimaging research experiments 
that support the development of accurate human models of human memory, decision 
making, culture, and emotions, as well as funding GUI development and cognitive model 
development. This type of basic research, which supports the framework construction, 
will continue into the foreseeable future.  
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Appendix A: Concept Examples 
C1 US soldier is seen 
C2 Two or more US soldiers are seen 
C3 One or more US soldier is moving directly towards me 
C4 US soldier has not gazed upon me fovelally 
C5 One or more US soldier is keeping a gaze directed toward me 
C8 An Iraqi person is standing nearby (one meter away) 
C9 Iraqi people are within view 
C10 US soldier is standing very near me (one meter away) 
C11 US soldier is talking to me 
C12 US soldier is asking me questions 
C14 US soldier is communicating back to others regarding questioning 
me 
C21 US soldier is gazing at merchandise 
C22 US soldier is walking from vender stand to vender stand 
C23 US soldier is in a searching posture 
C24 US soldier are holding a rifle in a military stance 
C25 US soldier is asking detailed questions  
C26 US soldier is scanning people  
C27 US soldier is looking at the Iraqi women 
C28 US soldier is very direct  
C29 US soldier is standing at a distance from me (3 meters away) 
C31 US soldier is looking around my merchandise 
C32 US soldier is moving around my merchandise 
C33 US soldier asked my permission to look at my merchandise 
C34 US soldier asked my permission to move around my merchandise 
C35 US soldier gave traditional greeting 
C36 US soldier took off his sun glasses  
C37 US male soldier is looking at my wife 
C38 US male soldier is talking to my wife 
C39 my wife is loudly fussing at the male soldier 
C40 my wife is using angry gestures 
C41 I feel myself getting angry 
C42 female soldier is near me 
C43 female soldier is talking to me 
C44 female soldier is talking to my wife 
C45 soldier asked permission to talk to me 
C46 No soldiers are seen 
C47 I don't feel any great threat 
C48 US soldier is looking near my weapons cache 
C49 Male US soldier is asking permission to talk to my wife 
C50 Female US soldier is asking permission to talk to my wife 
C51 US soldier is aiming his rifle directly at me 
C52 US soldier is in direct path of me 
C53 US soldier moving directly towards me 
C54 Female Iraqi is seen 
C55 Female Iraqi is talking 
C56 Female is near me 
C57 My spouse is near by 
C58 My friend is near by 
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Appendix B: Perception Examples 
P1 One soldier is moving near me for purpose other than to buy 
merchandise  
P2 One soldier is not searching for anyone 
P3 Western military forces not perceived to be in area 
P4 Two or more soldiers are moving near me for purpose other 
than to buy merchandise 
P5 Two or more soldiers are not searching for anyone 
P6 Soldier is interrogating me and may suspect me of hiding 
something, but is not offensive  
P7 Soldier is interrogating me and may suspect me of hiding 
something and is offensive  
P8 One or more US soldier is engaging in actives other than 
military operations 
P9 One or more US soldier is engaging behaviors typical for 
military operations 
P10 US soldier is friendly, asking detailed questions, but is 
sensitive to my culture 
P11 US soldier is using mannerisms that offend my culture 
P12 US soldier is not making any move to arrest me 
P13 US soldier is looking and moving around my merchandise 
without my permission 
P14 US soldier is looking and moving around my merchandise with 
my permission 
P15 US soldier is not interested in buying my merchandise 
P16 US soldier gave the proper greeting  
P17 My wife's honor is offended 
P18 US soldier is asking my wife questions with my permission 
P19 Female soldier is asking my wife questions 
P20 US soldier is ready to shoot me 
P21 US soldier can block my escape  
P22 Soldier is offending my honor 
P23 Soldier talking to me is the appropriate sex and respectful 
P24 No soldiers are near by 
P25 A female friend is nearby 
P26 I am protected by family/friends 
P27 US soldier looks threatening 
P28 US soldier is violating my personal space 
P29 I feel threatened 
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Appendix C: Intermediate Sub Goal State Examples* 
VENDER ONE – INTERMEDIATE GOAL STATES 
SG2 I seek not to be apprehended 
SG3 I seek to look innocent/friendly 
SG4 I seek to sell my merchandise, but I am nervous 
SG5 I seek to converse with a nearby person 
SG6 I seek to sell my merchandise 
SG7 I seek to comply with the US soldier’s demands and questions 
SG8 I seek to defend my honor but not be arrested  
SG9 I seek to appease the soldier, but he is suspicious 
SG10 I seek to show the soldier my anger 
WIFE OF VENDER ONE - INTERMEDATE GOAL STATES 
SG3 I seek to look innocent/friendly 
SG4 I seek to sell my merchandise, but I am nervous 
SG5 I seek to converse with a nearby person 
SG6 I seek to sell my merchandise 
SG7 I seek to comply with the US soldier’s demands and questions 
SG8 I seek to defend my honor but not be arrested  
SG9 I seek to appease the soldier, but he is suspicious 
SG10 I seek to show the soldier my anger 
SG11 I seek to watch the soldier  
SG12 I seek to stare at the soldier 
VENDER TWO - INTERMEDIATE GOAL STATES 
SG1 I seek not to be detected 
SG2 I seek not to be apprehended 
SG3 I seek to look innocent/friendly 
SG4 I seek to sell my merchandise, but I am nervous  
SG5 I seek to converse with a nearby person 
SG6 I seek to sell my merchandise 
SG7 I seek to comply with the US soldier’s demands and questions 
SG8 I seek to defend my honor but not be arrested 
SG9 I seek to appease the soldier, but he is suspicious 
SG10 I seek to show the soldier my anger 
SG11 I seek to protect my weapons at all cost 
SG12 I seek not to be shot 
SG13 I seek to find another escape path 
 
*Note: Some of the Intermediate Sub Goals have been removed from the original list.  
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Appendix D: Perception-Emotion Examples 
VENDER ONE - PERCEPTION AND EMOTION BINDINGS 
P1 = F(.5), A(.1)   P11 = F(.5), A(.10)   
P2 = F(.1), A(.1)   P12 = F(.3), A(.1) 
P3 = F(.0), A(.0)   P13 = F(.4), A(.6) 
P4 = F(.6), A(.1)   P14 = F(.2), A(.0) 
P5 = F(.1), A(.1)   P15 = F(.2), A(.1) 
P6 = F(.7), A(.2)   P16 = F(.1), A(-.4) 
P7 = F(.8), A(.9)   P17 = F(.1), A(.10) 
P8 = F(.1), A(.1)   P18 = F(.2), A(.2) 
P9 = F(.6), A(.2)   P19 = F(.2), A(.1) 
P10 = F(.2), A(.0) 
WIFE OF VENDER ONE - PERCEPTION AND EMOTION BINDINGS 
P1 = F(.6), A(.10) 
P2 = F(.1), A(.-2) 
P3 = F(.-1), A(.-6) 
P4 = F(.2), A(.1) 
VENDER TWO - PERCEPTION AND EMOTION BINDINGS 
P1 = F(.7), A(.2)   P11 = F(.6), A(.9) 
P2 = F(.2), A(.2)   P12 = F(.4), A(.2) 
P3 = F(.1), A(.1)   P13 = F(.6), A(.6) 
P4 = F(.7), A(.4)   P14 = F(.6), A(.3) 
P5 = F(.2), A(.2)   P15 = F(.3), A(.3) 
P6 = F(.8), A(.2)   P16 = F(.2), A(0) 
P7 = F(.8), A(.9)   P17 = F(.10), A(.8) 
P8 = F(.2), A(.2) 
P9 = F(.6), A(.5) 
P10 = F(.6), A(.1) 
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Appendix E: Possible Action Intention State Examples 
VENDER ONE - ACTION INTENTION AND EMOTION BINDING 
AI1 I intend to position myself so that I am not seen 
AI2 I intend to fight, hide, or kill in order not to be apprehended 
AI3 I intend to look innocent by doing non-threatening things 
AI4 I intend to sell my merchandise and fit in to the crowd 
AI5 I intend to walk near and discuss things with my nearby friend 
AI6 I intend to answer the soldier's questions and do what he wants 
as long as it doesn't neg. affect me.  
AI7 I intend to show how angry I am towards the soldiers 
WIFE OF VENDER ONE - ACTION INTENTION AND EMOTION BINDING 
AI3 I intend to look innocent by doing non-threatening things 
AI4 I intend to sell my merchandise and fit in to the crowd 
AI5 I intend to walk near and discuss things with my nearby friend 
AI6 I intend to answer the soldier's questions and do what he wants 
as long as it doesn't neg. affect me.  
AI7 I intend to show how angry I am towards the soldiers 
VENDER TWO - ACTION INTENTION AND EMOTION BINDING 
AI1 I intend to position myself so that I am not seen 
AI2 I intend to fight, hide, or kill in order not to be apprehended 
AI3 I intend to look innocent by doing non-threatening things 
AI4 I intend to sell my merchandise and fit in to the crowd 
AI5 I intend to walk near and discuss things with my nearby friend 
AI6 I intend to answer the soldier's questions and do what he wants 
as long as it doesn't neg. affect me.  
AI7 I intend to show how angry I am towards the soldiers 
AI8 I intend to do what ever it takes to stop the soldiers from 
taking my weapons.  
AI9 I intend to surrender  
AI10 I intend to run in another direction 
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Appendix F: Possible Action Script Examples* 
VENDER ONE - ACTION SCRIPTS 
AS1 run away 
AS2 hide under vender stand 
AS4 smiles and nods at soldier 
AS5 nods at soldier script 
AS6 smiles and gestures for the soldier to come and look at his 
merchandise 
AS7 calls for people in general to look at his merchandise 
AS8 walks over to a person near by to talk to him  
AS9 looks at soldier only  
AS10 ignore soldier 
AS11 stands and answers question  
AS12 screams at soldier and curses him 
WIFE OF VENDER ONE - ACTION SCRIPTS 
AS4 smiles and nods at soldier 
AS5 nods at soldier 
AS6 smiles and gestures for the soldier to come and look at 
merchandise  
AS7 calls for people in general to look at merchandise 
AS8 walks over to a person near by to talk to him  
AS9 looks at soldier only  
AS10 ignores soldier 
AS11 stands and answers question  
AS12 screams at soldier and curses him 
VENDER TWO - ACTION SCRIPTS 
AS1 run away 
AS2 hide under vender stand 
AS3 shoots soldier 
AS4 smiles and nods at soldier 
AS5 nods at soldier 
AS6 smiles and gestures for the soldier to come and look at his 
merchandise 
AS7 calls for people in general to look at his merchandise 
AS8 walks over to a person near by to talk to him 
AS9 looks at soldier only 
AS10 ignores soldier 
AS11 stands and answers question  
AS12 screams at soldier and curses him 
AS13 signals for nephew to fire upon the soldiers 
AS14 tries to cover the weapons cache 
AS15 no change in behavior 
AS16 raise hands to surrender 
AS17 run away from soldier OR run in a different direction from 
soldier 
 
*Note: Some of the Action Scripts have been removed from the original list.  
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